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SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT V. REDDING AND
SCHOOL STRIP SEARCHES: ALMOST, BUT NOT QUITE
THERE YET
Timothy J. Petty

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Safford Unified School District v. Redding and held that the strip search of thirteenyear-old Savana Redding was unconstitutional under the Fourth
1
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Redding is important because
it marks the first time that the Supreme Court has addressed strip
searches in schools; the Court has only considered the Fourth
2
Amendment in the school context on two other occasions. In Redding, school officials suspected Savana Redding of carrying banned
3
prescription-strength and over-the-counter pills without permission.
At the end of a series of searches, female school officials, upon the
directive of the school principal, ordered Savana to strip down to her
underwear, “pull her bra to the side and shake it,” and “pull out the
4
elastic on her underpants.” The strip search caused Savana to ex5
pose her breasts and pelvic area. The Court determined that the
Fourth Amendment did not permit the strip search of the thirteen-
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1
129 S. Ct. 2633, 2643 (2009).
2
The other two U.S. Supreme Court cases that considered the Fourth Amendment in the school setting are New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and Vernonia
Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Vernonia considered whether random urinalysis testing of student athletes violates the Fourth Amendment. 515 U.S. at 648.
T.L.O., however, deals with the search of a student’s belongings in a school. 469 U.S.
at 328. T.L.O. also marked the first time that the Supreme Court considered how the
Fourth Amendment should apply, if at all, to searches in schools conducted by
school officials. Id. at 332.
3
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
4
Id.
5
Id.

427
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year-old female student under those circumstances because of insuf6
ficient danger or information about the item’s location.
To someone unfamiliar with the history of Fourth Amendment
school search jurisprudence, the result that the Court reached in
Redding may seem like an obvious conclusion. Moreover, the result
that the Court reached may seem like the only reasonable conclusion
under the circumstances. But lower courts have demonstrated an inability to reach such seemingly sound rulings and have found arguably less reasonable strip searches either constitutional or protected by
7
qualified immunity. In Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education, for
example, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for school
officials who strip searched two eight-year-old girls in a school bathroom in an attempt to locate seven dollars that one student had re8
ported missing from her purse. Cases like Jenkins are the result of
courts taking a vague standard and applying it in a way that leads to
unfortunate outcomes. The case law leading up to Redding contains
examples of courts construing the standard to justify the result that
each court wanted to reach.
Prior to the Court’s recent decision in Redding, the U.S. Supreme Court’s only other attempt to express what the Fourth
Amendment permits in the school search context occurred over two
9
decades ago in New Jersey v. T.L.O. In T.L.O., the Court held that
Fourth Amendment protection does apply to searches conducted by
10
public school officials. Although the Court provided protection, it
also imposed a lesser standard and declared that searches conducted
by school officials must only be reasonable under the circumstances
11
rather than be supported by probable cause.
Despite T.L.O.’s guidance, lower courts that have considered
school strip searches have managed to misapply the standard, which
has created more confusion for future courts that consider similar
cases. Specifically, courts often apply the T.L.O. test in different ways,
12
and some courts stress certain factors more than others. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has declined to take any certiorari petitions over the last twenty-five years to clarify the standard and how it

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Id. at 2643.
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 822–23. See infra Part II for a discussion of similar cases.
469 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 333.
See id. at 340.
See infra Part II.C.
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should be applied, particularly in the strip search context. This lack
of clarification by the Court has allowed the confusion and inconsistencies to continue among the lower courts.
The Court made an attempt to rectify these problems in Redding.
Although it clarified T.L.O. and added two additional factors to the
14
T.L.O. standard, the Court may not have gone far enough to assure
that the same problems do not continue. Fortunately, the Court did
provide additional guidance on the extent of permissible strip
searches. The real effect of the decision, however, depends on
whether lower courts properly apply Redding when facing strip search
questions under slightly different factual circumstances. This Comment will analyze the two additional factors promulgated by the
Court in Redding to demonstrate that strip searches conducted by
school officials in the school setting should almost always violate the
Fourth Amendment. This Comment will also propose that both factors should be required to justify an intrusive strip search.
Another subsidiary problem to the improper application of the
T.L.O. standard is qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a doctrine that allows public officials to avoid liability when making decisions in an official capacity if they can show that although they violated the law, they had insufficient notice because clearly established
15
law does not indicate a constitutional violation. When deciding cases involving searches by school officials, even if courts find that an
official violated the Fourth Amendment, courts often find that the
law was unclear and grant qualified immunity to the official. The
frequent granting of qualified immunity under the current standard
compounds the problem by creating a snowball effect where each
court that grants qualified immunity is failing to clarify the standard
16
for school searches in their jurisdiction. Granting qualified immunity ignores T.L.O. and perpetuates unconstitutional searches by permitting school officials to escape liability.
In Redding, the Court granted qualified immunity to the school
17
officials who conducted the strip search of Savana. The decision to

13
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966 (1997).
14
See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642–43. When considering the reasonable-in-scope
prong of the T.L.O. standard, the Court noted that there was no danger to the students due to the small quantity of prescription drugs and that there was no reason to
suspect that Savana was hiding the pills in her underwear. Id.
15
See id. at 2643.
16
See, e.g., Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
17
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637–38.
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grant qualified immunity in Redding may be seen as a stamp of approval to both school officials who act outside of their authority and
to courts that may be inclined to continue granting immunity to
school officials. Most importantly, the imprecise standard articulated
by the Court and its grant of qualified immunity may lead lower
courts to continue granting qualified immunity when novel situations
not previously evaluated under the new Redding test arise.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of case law regarding strip searches in the school setting under the Fourth
Amendment. The focus of this Part will be the Supreme Court’s decision in T.L.O. and the circuit courts that have since interpreted the
T.L.O. standard. This Part will demonstrate that although T.L.O. offered a good standard at the time, it has faced much misapplication
and dilution by lower courts. Part II will also discuss how Redding attempted to properly clarify the T.L.O. standard by offering guidance
for future courts on the constitutionality of strip searches as well as
18
the potential implications of that guidance. Notably, the Court refrained from seizing the opportunity to ban strip searches altogether.
Part III of this Comment will examine the Redding factors and suggest
that the test should be read by courts as a conjunctive, rather than
disjunctive, test. Part IV of this Comment will discuss the Court’s
grant of qualified immunity, which may create a situation where qualified immunity is improperly granted in the future due to the imprecise standard established in Redding. Part V will conclude with a brief
discussion of the possible impact going forward.
II. SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath of affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
19
seized.

The Fourth Amendment is the guiding force behind all
searches, whether in the home, the car, or the school. The main focus of the Fourth Amendment is that searches should not be “unreasonable.” As for the warrant requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court
18

This Comment will focus more on the “reasonable-in-scope” prong of the
T.L.O. test because Redding focused more on that prong.
19
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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has articulated that searches outside the judicial process without ap20
proval are per se unreasonable unless a warrant exception applies.
Some exceptions to the warrant requirement include “hot pursuit,”
consent to a search, search incident to arrest, pat downs, and admin21
istrative searches. Importantly, one of those exceptions to the rule
permits warrantless searches when the government has a special need
22
that would be frustrated by the traditional warrant requirements.
T.L.O. serves as an example of a situation where a warrant was not re23
quired due to the special circumstances of the school setting.
B. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of School Searches
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided that a reasonableness test
24
should apply to searches conducted by school officials. In T.L.O., a
teacher discovered two girls smoking in the bathroom, one of whom
25
26
was T.L.O. T.L.O. denied the allegation that she was smoking.
The school principal, Choplick, searched T.L.O.’s purse, located a
27
pack of cigarettes, and removed the pack from the purse. After removing the cigarettes, Choplick noticed rolling papers, which he be28
lieved to be related to drug use, and continued to search the purse.
Choplick then found marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a large
amount of one-dollar bills, and an index card containing students’
29
names.
Although the State of New Jersey only raised the issue of whether
the exclusionary rule should bar certain evidence, the Court took the
opportunity to consider the limits that the Fourth Amendment places
30
on searches conducted by school officials. The Court began its discussion by noting that state and federal courts have struggled to find
a balance between protecting students’ Fourth Amendment interests
and providing school officials with the ability to maintain a safe learn-

20

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See David C. Blickenstaff, Strip Searches of Public School Students: Can New Jersey v.
T.L.O. Solve the Problem?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
22
See id.
23
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 328.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
30
Id. at 331–32.
21
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31

ing environment.
The Court then explained that although the
Fourth Amendment typically applies to police conduct, the Court has
32
never limited its application to situations involving the police. It
then discussed how some courts have used the theory of in loco paren33
tis, which means acting in the place of the parent, to determine that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply to teachers’ and school administrators’ conduct because their authority comes from parents,
34
not the State. T.L.O. rejected this approach because education is
compulsory; thus, the Court explained, schools cannot claim parental
35
immunity while carrying out public policy.
After determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to school
officials, the Court turned to a discussion of the appropriate Fourth
36
Amendment standard for searches in the school setting. The Court
noted that the underlying requirement of Fourth Amendment
searches is that they must be reasonable and that reasonableness de37
pends on the context of the search. According to the Court, in order to receive Fourth Amendment protection, one must have a legi38
timate privacy expectation that is recognized by society. The Court
then acknowledged that schoolchildren have legitimate reasons for
bringing non-contraband items to school and that there is no reason
39
to conclude that they have waived their right to privacy.
The Court weighed the rights of schoolchildren against the legitimate interest that schools have in maintaining discipline and recognized that school officials should be given flexibility with disciplinary
40
procedures. As a result, the Court determined that the warrant requirement is inappropriate for the school setting because it will bur-

31

Id. at 332 n.2.
Id. at 335; see, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (requiring building inspectors to comply with the Fourth Amendment).
33
In loco parentis literally means “in the place or position of a parent.” See 7
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 765 (2d ed. 1989).
34
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
35
Id. at 336–37.
36
Id. at 337.
37
Id. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s standard is
reasonableness and all searches, at the very least, must be reasonable. T.L.O., 469
U.S. at 337. Of course, higher standards, such as probable cause, are required in certain situations.
38
Id. at 338. Conversely, the Fourth Amendment does not protect subjective expectations of privacy that society deems unreasonable. Id.
39
Id. at 339.
40
Id. at 339–40.
32
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den the need for “swift and informal disciplinary procedures.” The
Court recognized that in most situations an official must have proba42
ble cause before a search can be performed. The Court explained,
however, that “[t]he fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although ‘both
the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear
43
on the reasonableness of a search . . . neither is required.’” The
Court then agreed with other courts that have determined that
searches in the school setting should hinge on the search’s reasonableness rather than probable cause because of the strong need to
44
maintain order.
The Court next parsed the reasonableness standard into a two45
part inquiry. The first inquiry considers whether “the search was
46
justified at its inception.” The Court explained that a search will
normally be “justified at its inception” if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that a search will reveal evidence of a violation
47
of the law or school rules. The second inquiry considers whether
the search conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the cir48
cumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Under the second prong, the Court provided that a search will be permissible in scope when the measures adopted “are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
49
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”
In T.L.O., the Court ultimately found that the first search for the
cigarettes was reasonable because Choplick had reasonable suspicion
that he would find the cigarettes in T.L.O.’s purse, a violation of
50
school rules. Next, the Court found that Choplick’s search for marijuana was justified because he had reasonable suspicion once he dis-

41

Id. at 340.
Id.
43
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 277 (1973)).
44
Id. at 341.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 341–42.
48
Id. at 341. The Court used language from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968),
in the two-part test it adopted in T.L.O.
49
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
50
Id. at 345.
42
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51

covered the rolling papers. The Court then concluded that the
52
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding marked the first time that
the U.S. Supreme Court applied its T.L.O. framework to a new set of
53
In Redding, Wilson, the assistant principal, requested that
facts.
54
thirteen-year-old Savana Redding accompany him to his office. Wilson then showed Savana a planner containing knives, lighters, a per55
manent marker, and a cigarette. Savana admitted that the planner
belonged to her but claimed that she had lent it to a friend and that
56
none of the items belonged to her. Wilson proceeded to show Savana four white prescription-strength ibuprofen and one over-the57
counter naproxen, which were banned under school rules. Savana
denied knowledge of the pills and that she had been giving them to
58
fellow students. Savana consented to a search of her belongings,
and Wilson, along with Romero, an administrative assistant, searched
59
Savana’s backpack.
After failing to locate the pills in the backpack, Wilson instructed
60
Romero to take Savana to the nurse’s office to search her clothes.
Romero and the school nurse, Schwallier, asked Savana to remove
61
her jacket, socks, and shoes. Next, the school officials, both female,
51
Id. at 347. Thus, under the two-part test, the search for cigarettes was justified
at its inception and the search of the purse and the further search for marijuana
were reasonable in scope.
52
Id. at 347–48.
53
See 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of random urinalysis testing of student athletes. Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). In Vernonia, the Court held that the urinalysis
policy conducted by the school did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of
“the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and
the severity of the need met by the search.” Id. at 664–65. The Court in Vernonia,
however, did not apply the T.L.O. framework and relied on T.L.O. primarily for
background information on the scope of privacy in the school setting. Id. at 652–57.
Rather than apply the T.L.O. framework, the Court examined the reasonableness of
the school’s urinalysis policy and concluded that it was reasonable and therefore
constitutional. Id. at 664–65. Interestingly, the dissent noted that the evidence that
the school district used to justify its suspicionless drug-testing program could have
been used to justify a search of particular students for drugs under T.L.O. Id. at 679
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
54
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
61
Id.
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asked Savana to remove her stretch pants and t-shirt, neither of which
62
contained pockets. Lastly, the school officials instructed Savana to
“pull her bra out to the side and shake it” and “to pull out the elastic
63
on her underpants.” These actions exposed, to some degree, Sava64
na’s breasts and pelvic area.
Savana’s mother filed suit against the school district, Wilson,
Romero, and Schwallier claiming that the strip search violated Sava65
na’s Fourth Amendment rights. The individual defendants moved
for summary judgment and contended that Savana’s rights were not
violated and, if they were, that the qualified immunity defense ap66
plied. The District Court for the District of Arizona granted the
summary judgment motion after determining that the search did not
67
68
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The
circuit, sitting en banc, however, reversed the decision and found
that the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment under the
69
T.L.O. test. The en banc court determined that the strip search
70
failed both prongs of the T.L.O. test. In addition, the court held
that T.L.O. clearly established constitutional principles that put
school officials on notice, and for that reason, it denied qualified
71
immunity for Wilson.
72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Redding Court began its analysis by discussing T.L.O. and noting that unlike the probable cause standard, the lesser standard for school searches only requires school officials to have a “moderate chance of finding
73
evidence of wrongdoing.”
The Court turned to a discussion of

62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 504 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 2007).
67
Id. at 829.
68
Id.
69
Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 1071, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Grant of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129
S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-479).
73
See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009). The Court
indicated that some factors to consider are the degree to which the facts suggest
prohibited conduct, the specificity of the information, and the reliability of the
source. Id. The Court, however, noted that none of these factors can control and
that standards are fluid and depend on the context. Id.
63
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whether the school officials were justified in their search of Savana.
After examining the facts leading up to the initial search of Savana’s
backpack, the Court concluded that Wilson’s level of suspicion about
Savana’s involvement in pill distribution justified a search of Savana’s
75
bag and outer clothing. The Court found that the searches were not
excessively intrusive given the facts that the school officials uncovered
and acted on; it stated that “[i]f Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill
distribution were not understood to support searches of outer clothes
76
and backpack, it would not justify any search worth making.”
77
The Court next focused on the strip search. First, the Court
discussed the seriousness of strip searches by acknowledging reactions of students who have been strip searched and noted that personal privacy expectations suggest that strip searches require a higher
78
level of justification. The Court recognized that strip searches can
be frightening, embarrassing, and humiliating, particularly for adolescents, and as a result, some jurisdictions have banned them alto79
gether. While strip searches are highly invasive, the Court made it a
point to state that they may still be permissible in some circums80
tances; T.L.O. governs the searches’ constitutionality.
Applying the T.L.O. standard, the Court stated that the “content
of the suspicion” that Wilson possessed did not justify the level of intrusion of the search because of the limited threat that the prescrip-

74

See id. at 2640.
Id. at 2640–41. Prior to the search, Jordan Romero, another student, told the
principal that certain students had been bringing drugs and weapons to school and
that he had gotten sick after taking one of the pills. Id. at 2640. Romero gave a pill
that he said he had received from another student, Marissa Glines, and told the principal that students were planning to take the pills at lunch. Id. A search in the principal’s office revealed the pills along with a razor blade. Id. Marissa told Wilson that
Savana gave her the pills and that she did not know anything about the day planner.
Id. Wilson did not ask any follow-up questions regarding the likelihood of finding
pills in Savana’s possession. Id. The same school officials involved in Savana’s strip
search performed the same search on Marissa, finding no additional contraband. Id.
Wilson also gathered additional information from staff members that implicated Savana in other rowdy behavior. Id. at 2641. At this point the events involving Savana
took place. Id.
76
See id. at 2641. In other words, the Court found that the searches, excluding
the strip search, were reasonable at their inception due to the facts linking Savana to
the pills and were reasonable in scope because they were not excessively intrusive.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641–42.
80
Id. at 2642. The Court’s express decision not to ban strip searches will be discussed infra, in Part III.A.
75
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81

tion drugs presented to the students. The Court next stated that
Wilson did not have a reasonable suspicion that Savana hid the pills
82
in her underwear. The majority noted that cases do exist where individuals have hidden drugs in their underwear, but it found that a
mere general level of suspicion is not enough to justify such an intru83
sive search. Rather, the majority found that for a search as intrusive
as that performed on Savana to be reasonable, the officials must have
84
“a suspicion that the search will pay off.” The Court then determined that the combination of the prescription drugs’ lack of danger
and the officials’ insufficient suspicion that Savana carried the pills in
85
her underwear rendered the search unreasonable. Ultimately, the
Court concluded that “the T.L.O. concern to limit a school search to
reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion of
danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing
before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer
86
clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”
Turning to the issue of qualified immunity for the individual
school officials, the Court articulated the applicable standard: an individual is entitled to qualified immunity if clearly established law
87
does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The
Court next discussed how lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit
panel decision in the present case, have upheld strip searches under
88
the T.L.O. standard. It concluded that the foregoing court opinions
differed enough in their application of T.L.O. to require immunity

81

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642. The Court indicated that Wilson did not have a
reason to believe that students were distributing large amounts of drugs. Id. Wilson
also knew that the prescription pills possessed characteristics of common painkillers
equivalent to two Advil or one Aleve. Id.
82
Id. at 2642.
83
Id.
84
Id. The Court explained that in this case, the intrusion was not warranted
based on the facts. Id. It pointed to the non-dangerous contraband, the lack of a
tradition of hiding pills in intimate places among the students, and the lack of evidence that Savana hid the drugs in her underwear. Id. In addition, the Court noted
that the school officials never determined that Marissa actually received the drugs
from Savana, and even if she had, the transaction took place days earlier, which
would reduce the likelihood that Savana still possessed the pills. Id.
85
Id. at 2642–43.
86
Id. at 2643.
87
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
88
Id. The Court mentioned Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991),
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 113 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997), and Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003). Id. at 2643–44. See infra Part II.C for a more detailed discussion of these cases.
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89

for the school officials. The Court acknowledged that “disuniform
views of the law” do not always warrant qualified immunity but stated
that the cases are numerous enough to create doubt about T.L.O.’s
90
clarity.
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg, however, dissented on the
91
issue of qualified immunity for the school officials. Justice Stevens
first discussed how the majority opinion did not alter the T.L.O.
framework but merely applied it to the present case to find the search
92
unconstitutional. Justice Stevens noted that the conduct in this case
was “clearly outrageous” because it went far beyond permissible conduct under T.L.O.; thus, the conduct obviously constituted an inva93
Justice Stevens next discussed how
sion of constitutional rights.
qualified immunity should not depend on whether lower courts have
94
misread the Court’s precedents. The Justice noted that the Court
has relied on the divergence among courts in their decision to grant
qualified immunity only when qualified immunity would prevent offi95
cials from having to predict future law.
Justice Ginsburg also claimed that the strip search violated clearly established law under T.L.O. and, therefore, that the Court should
96
not have granted qualified immunity. Justice Ginsburg discussed
factors that contributed to the search’s unreasonableness and exces97
siveness under T.L.O. According to Justice Ginsburg, the search
could not be reconciled with T.L.O., and Wilson could not reasonably

89
90

Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643–44.
Id.
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal,
or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of
judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically
render the law unclear if we have been clear.

Id.
91

See id. at 2644–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2645–46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92
Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93
Id. at 2644.
94
Id. at 2644–45.
95
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2645. Justice Stevens claimed that because Redding does
not alter the T.L.O. standard, the Court did not alter the applicable law. Id.
96
Id. at 2645 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97
See id. at 2645–46.
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have believed that the law permitted the strip search under the cir98
cumstances at issue.
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed with the majority that granting qualified immunity was proper; but, unlike the other eight members of the Court, Justice Thomas
claimed that the school officials did not violate the Fourth Amend99
ment. The Justice first stated that he supported returning to the
100
doctrine of in loco parentis, a much more deferential approach. Justice Thomas maintained that the majority used a vague standard that
permits judges to second guess school officials who are attempting to
maintain discipline and contended that the search was reasonable
101
under T.L.O. Justice Thomas explained that T.L.O. considered and
rejected the notion that a search’s legality depends on a court’s evaluation of the school rule; T.L.O. held that if the school administrators reasonably suspected a student of violating school rules, the ad102
ministrators could justify a subsequent search.
Consequently,
Justice Thomas argued that the Court has now placed school officials
in an impossible position of determining whether a given infraction is
103
severe enough to warrant an investigation.
Justice Thomas stated
that a standard based on the actual threat of a drug is unworkable
because it will require school officials to stop searches lest a court
subsequently find the offense not serious enough to warrant the
104
search.
Justice Thomas argued that the school should have been
105
able to enforce a school rule that amounted to a crime.
C. Circuit Courts’ Misapplication of the T.L.O. Standard
This Part examines circuit court opinions that have considered
strip searches in the school context. It will serve to demonstrate some
mistakes that courts have made when applying T.L.O. and the qualified immunity doctrine. The outcomes of these cases demonstrate
why Supreme Court intervention was necessary to clarify the constitutionality of strip searches in schools.

98

Id. at 2646. Justice Ginsburg quotes T.L.O. and states that the search became
“‘excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.’” Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
99
Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
100
Id.
101
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2646.
102
Id. at 2651.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 2651–52.
105
Id. at 2653.
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In 1991, six years after T.L.O., a high school student sued her
school and various school officials for a strip search that she claimed
106
violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
In Williams, a student informed the school principal, Ellington, that another student had of107
fered her white powder. Eventually, after more reports of students
108
using a substance called “rush,” Ellington and Assistant Principal
Easley removed Williams and Michelle from class and confronted
109
them about the allegations. Michelle took a brown vial containing
“rush” out of her purse, but both girls denied ownership of the vial or
110
any other drug. After failed initial searches, two female school officials asked Williams to remove her clothes down to her undergar111
112
ments. This search also failed to produce any drugs.
The Sixth Circuit noted that T.L.O. alone governed the question
113
of whether the search violated constitutional rights. The court then
stated that the lack of additional case law has left courts reluctant to
114
The court
define the contours of a Fourth Amendment violation.
concluded that it was not unreasonable for Ellington to believe that
115
the search did not violate the student’s rights. The majority found
Ellington’s decision to search to be reasonable based on the informa116
tion that he possessed at the time.
The majority also found the
117
search to be reasonable in scope due to the small size of the object.
In other words, Williams could have hid the object in her undergarments given the object’s size; thus, Ellington’s belief that she may
have hidden the drugs in her undergarments was reasonable. The
Sixth Circuit concluded by granting qualified immunity to the school

106

See Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 882.
108
“Rush,” according to the court, “is a volatile substance that can be purchased
over the counter, and while possession of ‘rush’ is legal, inhalation of it is illegal under Kentucky law.” Id. at 882.
109
Id. at 882–83.
110
Id. at 883.
111
Id. There was a factual dispute over whether Easley pulled on the elastic of
Williams’ underwear to see if anything fell out, but the court indicated that it was not
material for summary judgment. Id.
112
Williams, 936 F.2d at 883.
113
Id. at 886.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 887.
117
Id.
107
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officials based on clearly established rights at the time of the inci118
dent.
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit found a strip search of a student
119
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
In Cornfield, school
officials forced a student to change in the locker room so the officials
could visually inspect his body to assure that he was not carrying
120
drugs.
The school officials believed that the student was “crotch121
ing” drugs.
The court began its analysis by noting that the same reasonable
suspicion required for a search of a locker, bag, or pocket may not be
122
reasonable in the strip search context.
Next, the Seventh Circuit
considered the T.L.O. proclamation that age matters for reasonable123
ness. The court explained that children of different ages have different levels of potential criminality and determined that adolescents
could be capable of both criminality and understanding whether they
124
should consent to a search.
The court then stated that it will be
more cautious when determining the reasonableness of a search of
elementary school children because those children are not aware of
the impact of a strip search or whether it is appropriate to consent to
125
a strip search.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
search was reasonable, and although children at sixteen are selfconscious about their adolescent bodies, the school officials carried
126
out the search in the least intrusive manner possible.
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the grant of qualified immunity for school officials who strip searched elementary school stu127
dents suspected of stealing money from a classmate. The incident
began when a second-grade classmate informed the teacher, Fannin,
128
that seven dollars were missing from her purse.
Several students
implicated Jenkins, McKenzie, and Jamerson in the alleged theft, and

118

Williams, 936 F.2d at 887.
See Cornfield v. Consol. High School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th
Cir. 1993).
120
Id. at 1319.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 1321.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321.
126
Id. at 1323.
127
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed., 115 F.3d 821, 822 (11th Cir. 1997).
128
Id.
119
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Fannin questioned the students; each accused the other.
Fannin
asked the students to remove their shoes and socks, and when this effort to locate the money failed, she directed Jenkins and McKenzie to
130
the girls’ bathroom.
Another teacher, Herring, ordered the two
girls to enter the bathroom stalls and come back out with their un131
derpants to their ankles. The teachers failed to locate the missing
money and proceeded to bring the three students to the principal’s
132
office. Jamerson informed the principal that the money was hidden
behind a file cabinet, but a search in that location did not reveal the
133
money. Jenkins and McKenzie claimed that Herring escorted them
to the bathroom for a second time where they were asked to remove
134
their clothes again.
The Eleventh Circuit focused its opinion on whether the district
court should have granted qualified immunity to the individuals for
135
the Fourth Amendment claims.
The Eleventh Circuit began its
analysis by noting that T.L.O. is the only authority on school searches,
and thus, is the only authority that could have clearly established the
136
law.
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that the school
officials must have known that the search exceeded the reasonable137
ness standard established in T.L.O. The court indicated that T.L.O.
did not apply to the present facts with obvious clarity and that
“[t]here is no illustration, indication, or hint as to how the enumerated factors might come into play when other concrete circums138
tances are faced by school personnel.”
The court opined that

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 822–23.
133
Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 823.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 824 n.1.
137
Id. at 824.
138
Id. at 825. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit stated the following in relation
to the ambiguity of the current standard:
In the absence of detailed guidance, no reasonable school official
could glean from these broadly-worded phrases whether the search of a
younger or older student might be deemed more or less intrusive;
whether the search of a boy or girl is more or less reasonable[;] and at
what age or grade level; and what constitutes an infraction great
enough to warrant a constitutionally reasonable search or, conversely,
minor enough such that a search of property or person would be characterized as unreasonable.
Id. at 825–26.
130
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courts should not require school officials to interpret “general legal
139
formulations that have not been applied to specific . . . facts.” Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity finding
that the law did not put the school officials on notice that their con140
duct was impermissible.
In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of qualified immunity to a school teacher and an officer who conducted a strip
search of thirteen elementary school students in an attempt to locate
141
twenty-six dollars. After noticing that the money disappeared from
her desk, the teacher, Morgan, obtained permission from the vice
142
principal to conduct the strip searches. Officer Billingslea took the
boys into the bathroom in groups of five and asked them to drop
143
Billingslea
their pants; some dropped their pants and underwear.
144
then proceeded to check their underwear for the money. Similarly,
Morgan asked the female students to lift their shirts and their bras to
145
show that they did not possess the money.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that T.L.O. did not state whether a
search required an individualized suspicion and instead adopted a
146
reasonableness test. Citing Jenkins, the court concluded that T.L.O.
did not attempt to establish the contours of the Fourth Amendment
147
in different school settings. The court then posited that the T.L.O.
standard did not put defendants on notice that a strip search in this
148
case would be unconstitutional.
It suggested that when the standard is significantly general in nature, existing case law that applies
the general standard to more specific facts will usually be necessary to
149
give fair and clear notice.
Although the court ended up granting

139

Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 827.
Id. at 828. The dissent believed that T.L.O. sufficiently warns that a strip search
in these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted that the Supreme Court has never required factual identity for
qualified immunity. Id. at 829. The dissent argued that certain searches violate the
Constitution as a matter of common sense. Id. at 834. The dissenting judge also
opined that the nature of the infraction did not warrant a strip search and that strip
searches should only be permissible in extraordinary circumstances. Id.
141
Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 951–52 (11th Cir. 2003).
142
See id. at 952.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 953.
147
Roberts, 323 F.3d at 954.
148
Id.
149
Id.
140
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qualified immunity, it did note that an action in certain narrow circumstances may be so egregious that an official is not entitled to
150
qualified immunity even without well-established case law.
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit found a strip search of twenty students
for missing money to be unconstitutional but granted qualified im151
munity to the school officials. In Beard, teachers searched students
in the locker room for prom money that a student reported miss152
ing.
The search of the male students in the locker room by two
male teachers, Munz and Carpenter, consisted of the students “lower153
The
ing their pants and underwear and removing their shirts.”
search of the female students conducted by two female teachers, Balsillie and Langen, consisted of the females pulling up their shirts and
pulling down their pants, but not their underwear, while standing in
154
a circle.
Evaluating the strip searches of the male and female students
under T.L.O. and Vernonia, the court found that the searches violated
155
the Fourth Amendment. In finding the constitutional violation, the
court noted the highly intrusive nature of the searches, the fact that
the searches were conducted to locate money, the lack of individua156
lized suspicion, and the lack of consent. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the law at the time did not “clearly establish that the
searches were unreasonable under the particular circumstances
157
present in this case.”
Further, the court opined that T.L.O. and
Vernonia set forth basic principles for school searches, “yet do not offer the guidance necessary to conclude that the school officials were,
or should have been, on notice that the searches performed in this
158
case were unreasonable.”
150
Id. at 955 (“If the plaintiff . . . can show that ‘the official’s conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of
caselaw,’ then the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.” (quoting Smith v.
Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997))).
151
Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 601 (6th Cir. 2005).
152
Id.
153
Id. A police officer arrived halfway through the search of the male students
and told the teachers to continue searching the students because teachers “had a lot
more leeway” than the police. Id.
154
Id. at 602.
155
Id. at 605–06.
156
Id.
157
Beard, 402 F.3d at 606.
158
Id. In explaining T.L.O., the Sixth Circuit noted that “the Court did little to
explain how the factors should be applied in the wide variety of factual circumstances
facing school officials today.” Id.
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In Phaneuf v. Fraikin, the Second Circuit found a strip search of a
female high school student to be unreasonable under the Fourth
159
Amendment.
In Phaneuf, a student told Birdsall, a teacher, that
160
another student planned to bring marijuana on a school trip. The
student, Phaneuf, denied the allegation but both teachers present,
161
Birdsall and Cipriano, believed Phaneuf was lying. Cipriano asked
162
the school’s substitute nurse, Fraikin, to conduct the strip search.
Fraikin stated that she did not want to conduct the search herself,
and school officials asked Phaneuf’s mother to conduct the search or
163
the police would be called. Cipriano searched Phaneuf’s purse and
found cigarettes and a lighter while waiting for her mother to ar164
The mother strip searched Phaneuf in the presence of Frairive.
165
kin.
The court determined that the search was not justified at its in166
It found that the four factors raised by the
ception under T.L.O.
school officials—the tip from another student, Phaneuf’s disciplinary
problems, Phaneuf’s suspicious denial, and “discovery of cigarettes in
her purse”—did not create the reasonable suspicion necessary to jus167
tify the search. Specifically, the court determined that the student’s
tip justified additional investigation by school officials but did not jus168
tify a strip search. The court concluded by noting that the district
court never reached the qualified immunity issue and that it should
169
resolve the issue on remand.
D. Harms Associated with Strip Searches of Students
Many legislatures, courts, and researchers have taken note of the
emotional harm that can result from a strip search. Both states and
school boards have recognized the traumatic effects of strip searches
in the school context and have prohibited or severely restricted

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

448 F.3d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 2006).
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 594.
Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 594.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598–99.
Id. at 600.
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170

them.
For example, Wisconsin goes as far as to criminalize strip
171
searches conducted by school officials.
Courts have already recognized the intrusive and traumatic na172
ture of strip searches. The court in Justice v. City of Peachtree stated
that strip searches are “demeaning, embarrassing, repulsive, signify173
ing degradation and submission.”
The Seventh Circuit in Doe v.
Renfrow stated: “It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year old is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. More than that: it is a violation
174
of any known principle of human decency.” In Cornfield, the court
stated that “no one would seriously dispute that a nude search of a
175
child is traumatic.” The court recognized that adolescents will suffer greater trauma from a strip search because they are becoming
176
more self-conscious about their bodies.
A search of a child or adolescent has a greater impact than a
similar search of an adult because privacy is more important for a
177
child’s maturation than it is for an already mature adult.
A child
may even experience a strip search in a manner akin to sexual
178
abuse.
Even though school officials may be viewing or touching
during the search rather than sexually assaulting, the level of trauma
179
to the child may be the same.
Some post-search symptoms of victims include “sleep disturbance, recurrent and intrusive recollections
of the event, inability to concentrate, anxiety, depression and development of phobic reactions,” and strip searches may even lead to at180
tempted suicide. Also, the traumatic impact on any given child va-

170
See Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers and its Arizona Chapter et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S.
Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022 at *14 [hereinafter Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae Brief].
171
See id.
172
See id. at *16.
173
961 F.2d 188, 198 (11th Cir. 1992).
174
631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980).
175
Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir.
1993).
176
Id. at 1321 n.1.
177
Steven F. Shatz et al., The Strip Search of Children and the Fourth Amendment, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (1991).
178
Id. at 12.
179
See id. at 13.
180
Id. at 12.
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ries, and school officials do not know what the impact will be when
181
commencing a search.
In addition to the statements about the effect of strip searches
generally, Savana Redding’s experience illustrates a specific reaction
to a strip search. Savana stated: “I was embarrassed and scared, but
felt I would be in more trouble if I did not do what they asked. I held
182
my head down so that they could not see that I was about to cry.”
In addition, Savana stated:
The strip search was the most humiliating experience I have ever
had. Mrs. Romero and Mrs. Schwallier did not look away while I
was taking off my clothes. They did nothing to respect my privacy . . . [and] I felt offended by the accusations made against me
183
and violated by the strip search.

Savana did not return to the middle school after the strip search because she did not want to be near the school officials who searched
184
185
her. Savana attended an alternative high school but dropped out.
III. POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT REDDING FAILED TO ADDRESS AND WHAT
IT MEANS GOING FORWARD
A. Implications of Redding
Despite the obvious outrageousness of many school strip
searches, courts are reluctant to find constitutional violations. Lower
courts often looked for reasons to justify the search rather than apply
the T.L.O. test in a method consistent with the language of T.L.O.
and common sense. The Redding Court possessed a unique opportunity to guide lower courts by clearly realigning constitutional jurisprudence in school search cases with common sense. This Part examines Redding’s contribution and recommends how courts should
apply the Redding factors.
186
The Supreme Court in Redding, as suggested by Justice Stevens,
merely applied the T.L.O. standard in a way that it deemed proper in
relation to the facts in the case and did not substantively alter the test.
181

Id. at 13.
See Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 170, at *13.
183
Id.
184
See David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Weigh Strip-Searches at Schools, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2009, at 3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/19/nation/nastripsearch19.
185
Id.
186
In his dissent, Justice Stevens stated that “[n]othing the Court decides today
alters this basic framework . . . [and] it simply applies T.L.O. . . . .” Safford Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182
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The Court did attempt to clarify T.L.O. by indicating two factors that
should be considered when determining whether a search is reason187
able in scope under the second prong of the inquiry. Because Redding does not create a new test for school strip searches, it is possible
that the same types of problems and outcomes that existed before the
Supreme Court intervened will continue. Although the Court refrained from banning strip searches entirely, the two factors of the
reasonable-in-scope inquiry suggest that strip searches will pass con188
stitutional muster less than before Redding.
The first factor that the Court articulated under the reasonablein-scope prong is the threat presented by the item sought (“threat
189
factor”). When applying this factor to the second T.L.O. prong, the
Court determined that the drugs in question presented a limited
threat even though they could potentially pose more danger if stu190
dents digested them in large enough quantities.
Thus, both the
type and quantity of contraband can contribute to establishing a sufficient threat factor.
The second factor under the reasonable-in-scope prong is that
there must be some indication that discovering the evidence sought
191
requires an intrusive strip search (“location factor”). Moreover, the
mere fact that cases exist where students have hidden contraband in
192
General
their underwear does not make the search reasonable.
background possibilities that contraband is hidden in locations that
require strip searches are not enough; a reasonable search requires
193
suspicion that it will pay off. In addition, the Court pointed to the
fact that the strip search of the other student did not yield the pills,
and the allegations against Savana occurred days before Wilson or194
dered the search. The Court indicated that perhaps witnesses stating that Redding was hiding the pills in her underwear would have
195
contributed to the search’s reasonableness. Even though the Court
indicated general considerations for determining whether contra-

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

See id. at 2639 (majority opinion).
“Its indignity does not outlaw the search . . . .” Id. at 2636.
Id. at 2642.
Id.
Id.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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band is hidden in undergarments, it did not establish definitive crite196
ria for when location suspicion warrants a strip search.
The Court’s analysis of both factors does not provide much
guidance on how the factors should apply to situations outside of the
facts in Redding. First, the threat factor fails to explicitly guide school
officials as to what type and amount of drugs will warrant a strip
search. Presumably, at the very least, this additional factor means
197
that strip searches for money or other non-dangerous items will fail.
Under the threat factor, money does not pose a physical danger to
the student in possession or to the general student population. Additionally, a certain quantity of money does not render it more dangerous, as with prescription pills, for example. Next, although weapons
pose the greatest threat of immediate harm to students, a strip search
198
will not be necessary due to their size.
The inquiry becomes less
clear when school administrators search for drugs; the question of
determining what is serious enough to warrant a strip search still lin199
gers.
196
The factors that the Court lists are summarized as: 1) general practices of hiding drugs in undergarments at the school; 2) other students’ indications that the
drugs were hidden there; 3) a prior strip search yielded drugs; and 4) a short time
frame between the allegation and the search. Id. at 2642.
197
If strip searches for money and other non-dangerous items are not permitted
under Redding, two of the circuit court cases will no longer be good law on the permissible scope of a search. See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003)
(granting qualified immunity to officials who conducted a strip search of students in
an attempt to locate twenty-six dollars); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115
F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting qualified immunity for a strip search of two female second graders to locate seven dollars).
198
None of the cases cited in Part II of this Comment deal with weapons. See supra
Part II. Searches for drugs are much more commonplace than searches for weapons
as indicated by the widespread problem with drugs in schools. A search of outer
clothing and bags or backpacks will most likely reveal a weapon, which is much larger
in size than a handful of pills. After a school official searches outer clothing and
pockets, the only place left for a gun or knife would arguably be the waistband of
pants, and this item could be retrieved without conducting a strip search. In these
types of cases, where the suspicion that a student possesses a weapon is high enough
to potentially justify a strip search, the police probably have been involved. See generally Scott A. Gartner, Note, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at
School and How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 921,
924 (1997) (recommending that if a school official believes that a search will reveal
evidence of a serious crime, the student’s parents and law enforcement should be
notified).
199
Justice Thomas’s dissent addresses this concern. Cf. Safford Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2651 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority has
placed school officials in this ‘impossible spot’ by questioning whether possession of
Ibuprofen and Naxproxen causes a severe enough threat to warrant investigation.
Had the suspected infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it
would have approved the scope of the search.”). Justice Thomas contended that the
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Unfortunately, Redding did not indicate, beyond certain amounts
of particular prescription pills, which drugs at what quantity constitute a sufficient threat. Therefore, the majority’s determination that
the pills in Redding did not present a sufficient threat to warrant the
strip search will only be useful to school officials in similar factual circumstances involving similar prescription pills. It is unclear, for example, whether a small amount of marijuana constitutes a sufficient
200
threat.
Certainly, any drug, including prescription pills, can be
201
dangerous. Whether a common drug for students to possess, such
202
as Ritalin, could warrant a strip search if a student possesses it without permission is ambiguous under Redding. Ritalin works well and
203
Some condoes not produce negative effects on most children.
tend, however, that Ritalin “leads to future drug abuse, dulls a child’s
204
personality, and gives children ‘highs.’” Students buying Ritalin on
the black market and snorting it is another major concern, which can
205
Under the threat
lead to harmful results, such as toxic psychosis.
factor, courts will need to develop a system to weigh the potential
harmfulness of a substance to determine if a strip search is warranted.
Despite Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion that courts should
not distinguish between types of drugs, not all strip searches for drugs
should be found reasonable under the threat factor. According to
the majority’s evaluation, drugs will not always present a serious
majority neglected to honor the T.L.O. proposition that judges should not determine
the legality of the search based on their view of the importance of the school rule.
Id. at 2651. Justice Thomas stated that the school officials could have reasonably
concluded that the backpack search did not yield the pills because Savana hid them
in a place where no one would look. Id. at 2650. In essence, Justice Thomas argued
in his dissent that judges should not determine the reasonableness of a search based
on the importance of the school rule.
200
The confusion over which drugs would be serious enough to satisfy the requirement was apparent from oral arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). Some justices asked how the standard would apply
with certain contraband, such as a black marker pencil, methamphetamine, heroine,
and cocaine. Id. at 14. The Court’s opinion did not address these concerns.
201
Justice Thomas also noted that possession of prescription strength Ibuprofen
without a prescription is a crime in Arizona. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2652–53 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Thomas noted studies indicating the prevalence
of prescription drug abuse among adolescents. Id. at 2653.
202
Praveen Madhiraju, R.I.P. Ritalin in Proportion! The Eighth Circuit’s Restriction on
a Parent’s Right to Have Schools Accommodate the Needs of Their Disabled Children: Debord
and Davis, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1661, 1164–66 (2001) (explaining that three to five percent of children have ADHD and that Ritalin is the most commonly prescribed drug
for ADHD).
203
Id. at 1166.
204
Id. at 1167.
205
Id.
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206

enough threat to warrant a strip search. Prescription pills in general, including Ritalin, should not warrant strip searches even though
the Court put less emphasis on the harm of the drugs to the individual and more on the likelihood that students were distributing them
207
in large quantities.
While the Court indicated that the amount of
the drug can sometimes make a strip search reasonable, strip searching is too intrusive a method for attempting to locate prescription
pills that many students are permitted to possess. Without a legitimate and immediate threat to school safety, courts should not allow
strip searches under the threat factor of the reasonable-in-scope
208
prong.
The location factor of the reasonable-in-scope inquiry rightly
suggests that a school official conducting a strip search should at the
very least have some evidence that a student has hidden the contraband in his or her underwear. This factor clarifies part of the uncertainty the T.L.O. standard created and would have caused some of the
209
more obvious cases already decided to come out differently.
On
the other hand, a case with facts similar to Cornfield would seem to
210
pass this second factor. In Cornfield, the school officials had reason
211
to suspect that the student hid drugs in his crotch area. The poten-

206

See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2642.
Id. This notion is consistent with Cornfield, where the court admitted the limited threat posed by the suspicion that the student possessed marijuana. Cornfield
v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993). Although
marijuana is illegal and banned in all schools, the Seventh Circuit noted that it
created a limited threat to school safety and required a higher level of reasonableness for an intrusive search. Id. Therefore, under the Redding Court’s articulation of
the reasonable-in-scope prong, possession of small amounts of street drugs that do
not threaten school safety would fail due to lack of a sufficient threat for a strip
search.
208
Even if a strip search for drugs may be warranted because of the significant
threat posed by the contraband, the next factor, evaluating the suspicion that drugs
are hidden in undergarments, will make it almost impossible for a strip search to be
found reasonable.
209
See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955–56 (11th Cir. 2003) (granting qualified immunity for school officials who conducted a strip search for twenty-six dollars
without any reason to suspect the money would be located in the students’ undergarments); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997)
(granting qualified immunity based on a strip search for seven dollars where there
was no indication that the students were hiding the money in their undergarments);
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (granting qualified immunity
to school officials where no evidence suggested that the “rush” being searched for
would be located in the undergarments).
210
See generally Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th
Cir. 1993).
211
Id. at 1319.
207
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tial problem down the road is that the location factor alone will not
be enough to deter lower courts that had failed to fault school officials when they did not possess enough information to reasonably
212
search a student’s undergarments.
Fortunately, strip searches for money are seemingly no longer
proper under the threat factor of the reasonable-in-scope prong.
Again, it is unlikely that a strip search would be necessary to locate a
weapon due to its size. Therefore, similar to the threat factor, the location factor will become relevant almost exclusively when a student
is allegedly carrying drugs.
To permit any one of the vague indications that drugs are hidden in the undergarments to justify a strip search is unreasonable.
For example, a general practice among students of hiding pills in
their underwear at the school should not suffice to warrant a strip
213
search. Next, it would be dangerous to allow school officials to base
a strip search of a student on an incriminating statement by another
student without making sure the statement has some level of credibil214
ity.
Courts should require school officials to follow up on tips as
much as reasonably possible to assure that they are reliable enough to
215
warrant an intrusive strip search. Specifically, the credibility of the
tip should be examined before strip searching. Finally, as happened
in Redding, school officials sometimes obtain information about con212

At oral argument, the Court raised concerns over when a search of the undergarments is reasonable, and the Court did not respond to these concerns in the majority opinion. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford United Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). For example, Justice Alito raised concerns over the
reliability of student accusations. Id.
213
Cf. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003). Although not directly
on point, the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas found a strip search without particularized
suspicion to be unconstitutional. Id. at 956. The school officials in Redding suspected Savana of possessing the pills, which would satisfy the requirement of particularized suspicion set out in Thomas. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641. It seems unlikely
that, just because some students have hidden drugs in their undergarments, strip
searches will be more constitutional where school officials have no other reason to
suspect that the drugs were hidden in the undergarments.
214
Courts have recognized reliability concerns with informants’ tips. See Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Informant’s tips . . . may vary greatly in their
value and reliability.”). Reasonable suspicion depends on the content of information
and its reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). When evaluating the
totality of the circumstances to determine if reasonable suspicion is present, courts
should take into account the quantity and quality of the information. Id. Corroboration of details by independent police work is important to the totality of the circumstances inquiry. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983).
215
The Second Circuit in Phaneuf evaluated the informant’s tip and determined
that it was not reliable enough to warrant a strip search without additional investigation by school officials. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 598–99 (2d Cir. 2006).
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traband one day, and the strip search is performed on another day.
This situation raises concerns about the certainty that the contraband
is located where a strip search would be necessary to uncover it. All
of these factors represent obstacles school officials should overcome
before they possess reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amend217
ment that a student is carrying drugs in his undergarments. Generic evidence suggesting drugs are located in a student’s undergarments should not be enough for a strip search.
The Court articulated a disjunctive approach where only one of
the two factors of the reasonable-in-scope prong must be satisfied for
218
the search to be reasonable in scope. First, the Court indicated that
“what was missing from the suspected facts that point to Savana was
any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs
or their quantity, and any reasons to suppose that Savana was carrying
pills in her underwear. We think that the combination of these defi219
ciencies was fatal . . . .”
Two paragraphs later the Court explained
that “reasonable scope requires the support of reasonable suspicion
of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from
220
outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.”
B. A Proposed Solution Under Redding for Strip Searches in the
School Setting
221

It is unclear exactly how courts will apply the factors. It is possible that lower courts will follow the disjunctive wording in Redding,
defer to school officials, and only require that they meet one factor to
216

See Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
The Court in Redding did not indicate whether a visual detection of unusual
volume in the undergarment areas contributes to this factor. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at
2642. This should not count towards the reasonableness of the search because it is a
highly subjective inquiry of whether an area looks too large based on the opinion of
a school official. See generally Cornfield v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993) (involving facts where a school official noticed an “unusual bulge,” but the strip search did not yield the drugs).
218
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637 (2009) (“Because there were no reasons to suspect
the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her underwear, we hold that the
search did violate the Constitution . . . .”).
219
Id. at 2642–43.
220
Id. at 2643 (emphasis added).
221
One district court has restated the test as requiring one factor or the other. See
Foster v. Raspberry, No. 4:08-CV-123(CDL), 2009 WL 2355854, at *5 n.5 (D. Ga. July
29, 2009) (stating that even with individualized suspicion “the scope of the search
was not reasonable under the circumstances because there was no indication of danger to the students or any reason to suppose that King was carrying the iPod in her
underwear” (emphasis added)).
217
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justify the strip search. This Comment proposes that lower courts
should require both factors to be present—threat and suspicion—in
222
order for the search to be reasonable in scope.
Thus, the test
should be conjunctive rather than disjunctive. Further, the conjunctive view recommended should require a threshold amount of both
factors to be met rather than a balancing test. School officials should
require reasonable suspicion of each factor rather than just one factor.
A balancing test, although better than a purely disjunctive approach, still presents the opportunity for an unwarranted strip search
to be found constitutional. For example, under a balancing approach, a strip search for the same prescription pills involved in Redding would be found reasonable if the principal possessed more reliable information that the pills were located in Savana’s
undergarments. A reliable location factor should not diminish the
need for a strong threat factor as well. Additionally, a situation like
the one in Cornfield could arguably meet the location factor as long as
the court determined that a school official had a reasonable suspicion that a student was hiding contraband in his or her undergarments. This would impose an even lesser standard than in Cornfield
because in that case, that court at least acknowledged that an intrusive search should target contraband that poses a threat to school
223
safety.
Rather than have the effect the Court likely intended, Redding applied as a balancing test could serve to justify broader and
more intrusive searches than some courts have already permitted.
The conjunctive approach provides the most protection to students as well as guidance to school officials and reviewing courts. If
lower courts do not interpret Redding to require school officials to
meet both additional factors, the opinion could lose much of its bite.
For example, requiring only the location factor suggests that if school
officials reasonably believed that a student carried in his underwear a
permanent marker that was banned under school rules, officials
222
Cornfield supports this contention. See Cornfield, 991 F.2d at 1321. In Cornfield,
the Seventh Circuit articulated that “a highly intrusive search in response to a minor
infraction would similarly not comport with the sliding scale advocated by the Supreme Court in T.L.O.” Id. Despite this declaration, the Court later gets around this
statement by finding that the strip search “was the least intrusive way to confirm or
deny their suspicions [and] was not unreasonable.” Id. at 1323. Nonetheless, the
Seventh Circuit seems to be suggesting that a threat is required for an intrusive
search. The only difference in approach is that this Comment would contend that
the search in Cornfield, as with any strip search, is a highly intrusive search that warrants additional constitutional protection. For a brief discussion of the impact of
strip searches, see supra Part II.E.
223
Id. at 1321.
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could conduct a strip search. Alternatively, using just the threat factor, school officials could strip search a student they reasonably believed brought dangerous drugs to school even if they were almost
certain that the drugs were in the student’s locker and did not locate
them there during their initial search.
From a policy standpoint, requiring both factors assures that
strip searches will be deemed reasonable only in the most extreme
and rare circumstances. For example, if a school official receives a
reliable tip that a student possesses heroin and is hiding it in his undergarments, a strip search would be proper. Other students will be
protected against strip searches when the stricter test is not met.
From a practical standpoint, requiring both factors will make reasonableness determinations easier and more accurate. For example, if
courts find that one Redding factor is not met, the search would be
unreasonable and the inquiry would end. Also, if courts mistakenly
determine that either the threat or location factor is met, there is still
another factor to be met before the search is found to be reasonable.
When applying factor tests to factual situations that have yet to be
tested in court, requiring two factors instead of just one will add an
extra layer of protection before wrongly finding an intrusive search to
be reasonable.
Even if strip searches are constitutional in only the rarest cases,
the standard that the Court provided could lead to more problems if
224
not properly applied by lower courts. Therefore, the best solution
is to insist that lower courts properly apply both Redding factors while
using common sense about whether a search is reasonable. Because
the Court continues its use of a flexible standard for school searches,
common sense and attention to the intrusiveness of strip searches is
even more necessary. If courts do not agree on what is reasonable
under T.L.O., school officials will continue having difficulty recognizing the standard’s limits.

224

See Robert Barnes, Student Strip Search Illegal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A1.
For example, general counsel for the National School Boards Association stated that
“the decision did not provide clear guidelines about how specific the accusation must
be, or how dangerous the alleged drugs, before school officials employ such an intrusive search.” Id. Also, many of the circuit court cases examined in the background section stated expressly that qualified immunity was granted because T.L.O.
was not clear enough and that school officials should not be required to balance factors. See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
T.L.O. test did not put school officials on notice that a strip search would be unconstitutional); Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 11 F.3d 821, 825–27 (11th Cir.
1997) (stating that school officials should not be required to interpret general legal
formulations).
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Despite the potential for ambiguous future application of its
tests, Redding is in line with the Fourth Amendment and T.L.O. in its
attempt to assure that searches in school remain reasonable, both at
their inception and in scope. Although the opinion did not set out a
crystal clear standard to guide school officials who may still be confused about the permissibility of strip searches, lower courts should
enforce the test strictly by requiring both factors. As indicated in the
analysis above, enforcing the Redding factors strictly will mean that
strip searches will be less likely to be reasonable in scope than under
courts’ previous interpretations of T.L.O. Although the T.L.O.
prongs and the Redding factors can be met, a proper application of
the test will result in strip searches only under the right circumstances—extreme situations where a strip search may be necessary for
school safety.
C. Other Proposed Solutions for Strip Searches in the School Setting
Other authors, however, have taken different approaches to the
problem.
One author suggests a creative standard for strip
225
searches. The proposed standard would require the school official
226
Next,
to have probable cause before conducting a strip search.
strip searches would only be permitted to search for evidence of serious violations, which would mainly include situations involving
227
weapons and drugs.
Finally, the new standard would require that
the disruption resulting from the contraband be one that would re228
sult in an immediate disruption of school order. This approach is
in line with Redding by emphasizing that strip searches are particularly
intrusive and deserve stricter review. One potential issue, however, is
that school officials may not understand the probable cause standard.
Another author advocates a ban on strip searches in schools al229
together. The author suggests that law enforcement officials should
make the determination as to whether a higher standard of probable
230
cause exists to perform the search. If a situation is sufficiently dangerous that it would warrant a strip search under the Redding threat

225

See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 49.
Id.
227
Id. at 50.
228
Id.
229
See Gartner, supra note 198, at 924. The author recommends that if a school
official believes that a search will reveal evidence of a serious crime, school officials
should notify the student’s parents and law enforcement. Id.
230
See id. (stating that law enforcement would have to determine whether probable cause exists and then obtain a warrant).
226
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factor, perhaps it makes sense to involve the police anyway. On the
other hand, involving the police will likely refocus the situation away
from school safety and towards punishing the perpetrator if contraband is found. This approach may also seem too burdensome to
those who are concerned about school officials’ ability to control discipline in the school. An additional concern is that T.L.O. did not
envision the increased use of police in schools and therefore is in231
adequate to deal with commingling of schools and the police.
232
The Fourth Amendment requires searches to be “reasonable.”
Accordingly, because strip searches by school officials are unlikely to
233
be reasonable in the school setting, a ban on strip searches is an
234
appealing solution to the problem. In fact, several states and school
235
districts have already banned strip searches in their schools.
Despite this apparent trend towards banning strip searches, the judiciary’s role is to interpret the Fourth Amendment. In doing so, the
judiciary should conclude that strip searches in the school setting are
unconstitutional a large percentage of the time—when they fail the

231

Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law
Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 294, 325 (2004) (“Refusing to evaluate
T.L.O. . . . would allow school systems and law enforcement agencies to continue
sending children a poor message: We will subject you to a police state at school because you are children without rights, then we will subject you to severely-punitive,
adult-like consequences for any infraction.”).
232
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
233
See Barnes, supra note 224. Savana’s ACLU attorney stated that the Court
made clear that strip searches should only be used in “extraordinary circumstances.”
Id.
234
One author noted that it is unlikely that the Court will ever ban strip searches
or impose a stricter standard for evaluating them. See Patsy Thimmig, Note, Not Your
Average School Day—Reading, Writing and Strip Searching: The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision
in Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of Education, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1389, 1416
(1998). The author stated that the Court should at least require strip searches to be
reasonable. Id. The Court in Redding arguably imposed a stricter standard, although
technically it is just a clarification of T.L.O. This Comment suggests that a stricter
application of the standard will assure that permissible strip searches are reasonable.
235
Both states and school boards have recognized the traumatic effects of strip
searches in the school context and have prohibited or restricted their use. See Nat’l
Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 170, at *14. Seven states have
banned strip searches. Id. These seven states are California, Iowa, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.; see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49050
(West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 808A.2(4) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-6.1
(West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-102 (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-631140 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.600.230(3) (West 2010); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 948.50(3) (West 2009). Furthermore, many school districts, including New
York City, have banned strip searches. Nat’l Ass’n of Social Workers Amici Curiae
Brief, supra note 170, at *14. For a discussion of the power of local school boards to
adopt policies that ban strip searches, see generally Gartner, supra note 198.
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meet the T.L.O. prongs and the Redding factors. The Supreme Court
chose not to ban strip searches, so courts will have to stringently apply
the Redding test in the meantime.
IV. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. A Brief Description of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
The qualified immunity doctrine is not constitutional nor is it
statutorily created; rather, the Supreme Court created the doctrine
based upon the belief that governmental interests in the execution of
its policies may, in some circumstances, outweigh an individual’s in236
terest in challenging unconstitutional government conduct.
The Court first mentioned qualified immunity in 1967 in Pierson
237
v. Ray.
In Pierson, the Court held “that the defense of good faith
and probable cause . . . is available to [the police officers] in the ac238
tion under § 1983.” The Court’s first major consideration of quali239
In Scheuer, the Court
fied immunity occurred in Scheuer v. Rhodes.
determined that the governor of Ohio did not have a right to absolute immunity from suit but that qualified immunity may be available
240
to officers of the executive branch. In Wood v. Strickland, the Court
found that a school official is not immune from suit if he knew or a
reasonable person would have known that his official action would
violate the Constitution or if he acted with malicious intention to in241
terfere with another’s constitutional rights. Next, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damagdamages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
242
have known.” Harlow simplified the test by eliminating the subjec243
tive component and only examining the objective component.
Finally, in Anderson v. Creighton, the Court elaborated on the
qualified immunity doctrine once more and explained that the right
violated “must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

See Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Id. at 557.
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Id. at 235, 247.
420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Thimmig, supra note 234, at 1395.
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must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
244
that what he is doing violates that right.” Further, the Court articulated that “[t]his is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law
245
the unlawfulness must be apparent.”
In Anderson, the Court defined “clearly established” as whether a reasonable official would believe the conduct to be unlawful rather than whether the action was
246
unlawful. This clarification expanded the ability of public officials
247
to seek protection under the qualified immunity doctrine.
An officer is “entitled to qualified immunity where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amend248
ment.” Furthermore, the Court has held that “officials can still be
on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel
249
Fundamentally similar facts are not necesfactual circumstances.”
250
sary for finding a law to be clearly established.
One author discussed some of the practical implications of the
251
The author raised the difficulty of
qualified immunity doctrine.
understanding the difference between Fourth Amendment reasona252
bleness and qualified immunity. For example, “a police officer can
reasonably (within the meaning of qualified immunity) violate oth253
erwise clearly established Fourth Amendment dictates.” The author
suggested the potential problems of this type of logic applied to other
areas of law through the following hypothetical: “I may have been
254
negligent, but I was reasonable in believing that I wasn’t.”
244

483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Id. (citation omitted).
246
See id.; Thimmig, supra note 234, at 1395.
247
See id.
248
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822 (2009).
249
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
250
Id.
251
See Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris,
9 NEV. L.J. 185 (2008).
252
Id. at 193–94.
253
Id. at 193.
254
Id. at 194. For an interesting discussion on the qualified immunity doctrine,
see Blickenstaff, supra note 21, at 21–24. The author noted how Anderson gives officials two bites at the apple because officials escape liability even if their conduct is
found to be unreasonable as long as the reasonable official would have believed it to
be lawful. Id. at 23. The official can claim that even though he acted unreasonably
under the Fourth Amendment, the conduct was still reasonable because it was not
clearly prohibited. Id. at 23–24. The wisdom of the qualified immunity doctrine is
beyond the scope of this Comment, but it is important to recognize the potential
245
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The author, however, noted that the qualified immunity doctrine may be justified as not only a substantive defense but as a pro255
Thus, qualified immunity can be
cedural rights defense as well.
viewed as protecting officials from both financial burdens and the
256
burdens of a lawsuit.
The qualified immunity issue “creates a ‘su257
per-summary judgment’ right on behalf of government officials.”
The advantage for school officials is that even when summary judgment may not be proper, summary judgment may be granted if the
258
court finds that the law was not reasonably clear.
B. Redding’s Grant of Qualified Immunity
As discussed in Part II.B, the Court in Redding granted qualified
immunity to the school officials who conducted the strip search of
259
Savana. The majority acknowledged divergent conclusions on how
the T.L.O. standard applies to strip searches and found that the dif260
ferences of opinion were enough to warrant qualified immunity.
Interestingly, the majority noted that its grant of qualified immunity
does not mean that disuniform application of the law will always warrant a grant of qualified immunity but that it is warranted in this case
261
because the Court may not have been sufficiently clear in T.L.O.
C. Implications of Granting Qualified Immunity in Redding
The dissenting Justices correctly noted that Redding does not alter the basic T.L.O. framework other than clarifying the reasonable262
in-scope prong as it relates to strip searches. Although it is debatable whether qualified immunity technically should have been granted
263
in Redding, the majority recognized the confusion that existed
sweeping power that the doctrine has to allow officials to escape liability. In factual
circumstances where the conduct is clearly out of line, protection under the doctrine
should not be granted.
255
See Brown, supra note 251, at 194.
256
Id. at 195.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
260
Id. at 2643–44.
261
Id. at 2644.
262
See id. at 2644–46 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also stressed that “the clarity of a well-established right should not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents.” Id. at 2645. Consequently,
both the majority and dissent seemed to agree that qualified immunity usually is not
appropriate simply because lower courts got it wrong.
263
One author, discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jenkins, contended
that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and reversed the grant of
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amongst lower courts and decided to grant qualified immunity. Perhaps it is sensible for the Court to grant qualified immunity to the
school officials in Redding who conducted a strip search that was less
severe than other searches where courts have granted qualified im264
munity.
Post-Redding, it is difficult to predict how the Court’s grant of
qualified immunity will impact the Fourth Amendment school-search
frontier. The concern for future qualified immunity issues in the
school search context is twofold. First, courts may view the Court’s
grant of qualified immunity in Redding as a stamp of approval towards
granting qualified immunity in questionable situations. Second, because Redding uses a factor-based test that leaves the constitutionality
of strip searches in other contexts up in the air, courts may continue
to grant qualified immunity to school officials in novel situations that
are sure to arise. Consequently, Redding’s imprecision may perpetuate the improper granting of qualified immunity in novel factual
circumstances.
It is possible that because the Court failed to both articulate a
more comprehensive test for strip searches and deny qualified immunity, nothing will change. If Redding had articulated a clearer test,
the future of the qualified immunity doctrine in the school search
context would not be as uncertain. Conversely, if the Court denied
qualified immunity to the school officials, the Court would have at
least sent a more serious message that lower courts should not grant
qualified immunity as leniently as had been done in the past. Instead, the Court’s approach runs the risk of perpetuating the same
problems that existed pre-Redding.
It is more likely, however, that courts will follow Redding’s lead
and find unreasonable strip searches unconstitutional. Thus, lower
courts should stringently apply the threat and location factors under
the reasonable-in-scope prong of T.L.O. to prevent constitutional violations against school children. If this occurs, qualified immunity
will no longer provide school officials with an escape from liability.

qualified immunity in order to deter school officials from conducting unreasonable
strip searches of school officials. Thimmig, supra note 234. Another author stated in
reference to the decision in Thomas that “[c]ourts cannot continue to promote this
ignorance by granting qualified immunity to school officials and school districts.”
Dana Ingrassia, Note, Thomas Ex. Rel. Thomas v. Roberts: Another Photo Finish Where
School Officials Win the Race for Qualified Immunity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 621, 651
(2004).
264
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (1997)
(granting qualified immunity for a strip search of two female second graders for seven dollars that was missing).
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Because Redding directly considered a strip search under the T.L.O.
test, courts must recognize, as the Supreme Court did, the intrusiveness of strip searches and the emotional harm that can result. The
only missing piece to the solution is for courts to properly apply the
tests to limit strip searches to the extreme situations where they are
warranted.
Although the Court chose not to expressly ban strip searches,
the opinion in Redding recognizes the seriousness of strip searches in
both the emotional and the constitutional context. It is unlikely that
the Supreme Court will revisit the issue anytime soon; lower courts
will need to take responsibility for protecting student’s constitutional
rights. Once the ball starts moving in the right direction, the momentum should set the judicial system on the right course going forward.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Court expressed distaste for the strip search of Savana and further analyzed the second prong of T.L.O., the law could
remain almost exactly where it was over twenty years ago if the right
steps are not taken. Many circuit courts squandered the opportunity
to properly apply T.L.O. and deny qualified immunity to school officials conducting unreasonable strip searches of students. Lower
courts now must change course and properly apply the Fourth
Amendment to school strip search cases.
Redding clarified T.L.O. by adding two factors to the second
prong, requiring that the item in question present a threat and that
the school officials have a reasonable belief that the item is located in
265
the student’s undergarments.
Thus, Redding’s additional factors
and the application of these factors to the reasonableness requirement indicate that strip searches should rarely be found reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s approach allows some
flexibility for school officials to determine when the proper criteria
for strip searches exist, but courts need to prevent the test from becoming one where the lack of express factors results in finding no
constitutional violations. Because the Supreme Court is unlikely to
address the issue again, it will be up to the lower courts or legislatures
to properly address these issues.
Naturally, there is concern that the Court was insufficiently clear
in articulating how searches not entirely similar to the factual situation of Redding should be handled. Because Redding created a flexi265
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ble factor test, uncertainty about how the factors will be applied remains. This Comment proposes that lower courts need to take the
initiative to prevent unreasonable strip searches by carefully examining the threat and location factors established in Redding. Further,
courts should examine both factors in conjunction rather than allowing one factor alone to satisfy the reasonableness requirement.
Courts should insist that school officials possess a reasonable suspicion that each factor is satisfied independently rather than permitting
a strong showing of one factor to compensate for a weak or nonexistent showing of the other. For example, an item presenting a significant threat should not justify a strip search if very little or no evidence
suggests the item is located in a student’s undergarments. States and
school districts are free to ban strip searches, but until that decision is
made, the judiciary needs to safeguard students’ constitutional rights.
Finally, the Court’s grant of qualified immunity poses some potential problems when combined with the flexible factor test it provides. A grant of qualified immunity sends the wrong message to the
courts that have been improperly analyzing qualified immunity ques266
tions. Also, the ambiguous factors announced in Redding open the
door for the same problem where courts automatically grant qualified immunity in factual situations that have not been directly addressed by the Court. Using a stricter conjunctive approach to the
factors will remedy this issue as well.
When the Court granted certiorari in Redding, it had a unique
opportunity to rectify the problems that have been occurring in the
school strip search context. The Court went far enough in explaining factors that should limit strip searches to rare situations. Redding
indicated that strip searches are unlawful in at least one factual situation, ensuring that the scope prong of T.L.O. actually has some bite.
Importantly, the Court gave the judiciary the tools to properly handle
these situations. The factors in Redding should be used to bolster
T.L.O.’s reasonableness test and to prevent courts and school officials
from claiming that the guidelines for school strip searches are unclear. Lower courts must stop history from repeating by assuring that
Redding does not fall by the wayside like T.L.O. did over the past twenty-five years.
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See supra Part II.C.

